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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS
AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE US SARBANESOXLEY ACT PERSPECTIVE
Marc Massoud*, E. Daniel Shim**
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to review US corporate governance systems and to highlight the mandated
roles of audit committee and external auditor within the SOX Act. In addition, it discusses requirements
and implications of the SOX Act for the foreign accounting firms and multinational corporations. Finally
this paper provides a perspective on improvement of corporate governance and financial integrity. In
order to regain trust from the financial market, the SOX Act mandates (1) to improve auditor’s
independence by reducing conflicts of interest; (2) to increase corporate financial reporting responsibility
by requiring a CEO or a CFO certify accuracy of annual report; and (3) to enhance financial disclosures. It
also significantly increase criminal penalty for non-compliance. The authors believe that the combination
of strengthening auditor’s independence, increased corporate responsibility and severe penalty and
restored corporate governance would create an environment that is intended by the SOX Act. Volker and
Levitt (2004) put it very forceful way: “While there are direct money costs involved in good corporate
governance, we believe that an investment in good corporate governance, professional integrity and
transparency will pay dividends in the form of investor confidence, more efficient markets and more
market participation for years to come.” We concur with them and believe that the SOX Act will help in
restoring trust in corporate governance and improve financial integrity and quality of financial
information. We also agree that the benefits of the SOX Act will outweigh the costs of compliance in the
long-run.

* Professor of Accounting, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, CA 91711,
951-607-3203, marc.massoud@claremontmckenna.edu
** Associate Professor of Accounting, Director of Research, College of Business
Sacred Heart University, 5151 Park Avenue, Fairfield, CT 06824
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Introduction
The US historically has had the most robust capital
markets in the world in large part due to better
corporate governance systems. It is undeniable now
that most US capital markets participants including
financial analysts, accountants and regulators are under
attack. As more and more disclosures have come to
light, many of these market participants have shown to
behave irresponsibly, unethically and/or illegally.
“Shortly after the Enron scandal, other scandals
involving corporate giant (Tyoc, WorldCom, Xerox,
Adephia, Ahold, etc), brokerage firms (e.g., Merrill
Lynch), stock exchanges (e.g., New York Stock
Exchange), large public accounting firms (e.g., Arthur
Anderson, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG,
PricewaterhouseCoopers) and managers of mutual
funds (e.g., Piper Jaffray) were uncovered.” (Corporate
Governance and SEC, Skousen, Glover and Prawitt,
2005, p.5)
Confidence in our capital markets has been
undermined. Restoring the trust and credibility of
markets is one of the most important missions for all
parties concerned. Investors and public were initially

misled and then punished as the bubble expanded and
burst amidst a blaze of corporate misdeeds. Major fraud
cases over the last three years have destroyed over
$200 billion of equity value (Gadiesh, 2004).
Recently, we all have heard the same questions
over and over again: What happened to the US capital
market systems? Where were the board of directors and
the corporate governance? Where were the competent
and self-governing external auditors? Where were the
lawyers, the guardians of the systems? Where were the
investment bankers and the financial analysts, the
prodigies of the fuel that fed the bubble?
Perhaps greed and conflict of interests prevented
the participants from performing their respective
functions properly. Many forgot that their actions and
in-actions put their most valuable assets, the credibility
as well as the interests of their shareholders at risk.
Their reputation may never be regained or may take
years to refurbish.
The essence of the good governance system is the
proper stewardship; monitoring and managing people,
processes and activities of a corporation on behalf of
owners, shareholders. Good corporate governance
creates a system that demands proper stewardship over
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invested capital and faithfully reports the economic
condition and performance of the enterprise (Skousen
et al, 2004. p.7).That money, invested by the
shareholders, is to be protected. The board of directors
is supposed to monitor the management and external
auditor are responsible in providing assurance and in
attesting financial integrity and financial well-being of
a corporation and in reporting its opinion to
shareholders and management.
The purpose of this paper is to review the
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act and to highlight the
mandated roles of audit committee and external auditor
within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and to examine whether
these requirements will improve corporate governance
and financial integrity. In addition, it also discusses
requirements and implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act for the foreign multinational corporations, required
to register with US SEC.
The reminder of the papers is as follows: The
second section will provide an overview of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the required role of audit
committee and external auditor. The third section
discusses the requirements and implications of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to the foreign accounting firms
and multinational corporations. The fourth section
discusses corporate governance of UK and Germany.
The final section provides perspectives and
implications of the SOX Act.
The role of audit committee and external
auditors within the Sarbanes-Oxley act for
US corporations
McEachern and Massoud (1990) suggest that “the main
role of the audit committee is to oversee the financial
reporting process and enhance the credibility of that
process.”
The SOX Act establishes new responsibilities for
the audit committee in its capacity as a committee of
the board of directors. The responsibilities include the
appointment of the external auditor, determination of
audit fees and oversight of the auditor. The audit
committee must pre-approve all services provided by
external auditor, after determining that the services do
not pose conflict with the auditor’s independence.
Moreover, audit committee must be comprised of
independent directors and, among other things, whether
at least one member have to meet the specified criteria
of an “audit committee financial expert.” In addition
external auditor is required to directly report to the
audit committee which has new and expanded
obligations to serve on behalf of the board of directors
as the watchful guardian of shareholders interests. Thus
the SOX Act strengthened and expanded the audit
committee responsibilities. Table 1 summarizes the
responsibility and relationship of Audit Committee and
external auditor.
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 1 Here
-----------------------------------------

In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates
establishment of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB). The Board is a non-profit
organization to oversee the accounting and auditing
standards of the public companies. The purpose of
PCAOB is to protect the interests of the investors and
to further the public interests by monitoring for an
informative, fair and independent audit report. In
March 2004, the PCAOB approved the first important
standard, “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting Performed in conjunction with an Audit of
Financial Statement.” Section 404 (a) of SOX and
SEC’s related implementation rule require the
management of public company to assess the
effectiveness of the company’s internal control on
financial reporting. Section 404(b) as well as Section
103 directed PCAOB to establish the professional
standards governing independent auditor and assessing
the effectiveness of internal controls. The new standard
requires auditors to review management assessment of
the effectiveness of company internal controls, run their
own tests of those controls and judge the effectiveness
of corporate board members who sits on a firm’s audit
committee (www.pcaobus.org). The PCAOB in effect
ended self-regulations of auditing and attestation
standards, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
(GAAS).
The Sarbanes-Oxley act requirements and
implications to the foreign accounting firm
and multinational corporations
According to Section 106 of the SOX Act, foreign
public accounting firms who audit a U.S. company
required to register with the PACOB. This would
include foreign firms that perform some audit work,
such as in a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company, that
is relied on by the primary auditor. The Board exercises
authority over these foreign accounting firms. Foreign
accounting firms that "prepare or furnish" an audit
report involving U.S. registrants are subject to the
authority of the Board. Additionally, if a registered U.S.
accounting firm relies on the opinion of a foreign
accounting firm, the foreign firm's audit workpapers
must be supplied upon request to the Board or the
Commission (AICPA, 2004).
The Securities and Exchange Commission adopted
rules that the national securities exchanges and national
securities associations should prohibit the listing of any
security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the
audit committee requirements established by the SOX
Act. Table 2 summarizes the detailed requirement:
-----------------------------------Insert Table 2 here
-----------------------------------Generally, listed issuers are required to comply
with the new listing rules by the date of their first
annual shareholders meetings after Jan. 15, 2004, but in
any event no later than Oct. 31, 2004. Foreign private
issuers and small business issuers will be required to
comply by July 31, 2005. Many will argue that those
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requirements will lead to a decrease in number of
foreign company listed in the US exchange. Until now
it is difficult to speculate about the effect of this
requirement.
Corporate
Germany

goverance

in

the

UK

and

One of major issues about requiring foreign companies
to adopt the SOX Act is that many foreign companies
have their own country’s corporate governance rules.
According to section 301 of the SOX Act, foreign
corporations listing security in the US national
securities
exchanges
and
national securities
associations should adhere to the audit committee
requirements. The following presents a highlighted
summary of corporate governance of UK and Germany.
United Kingdom. In 1992, the Cadbury
Committee (The Committee on the financial aspect of
corporate Governance) investigated the accountability
of the Board of Directors to shareholders and to society
as a whole. The committee made recommendations to
improve financial reporting, accountability and Board
of Directors’ oversight. The Cadbury Committee
recommendations led to the Greenbury Report in 1995.
The Greenbury Report recommended to establish
extensive disclosures on directors’ remuneration in the
annual report of the UK companies. The Hempel report
in 1998 confirmed much of the work of Cadbury and
Greenbury Committees. That has led to the Confined
Code on Corporate Governance (2003). Compliance
with these codes is a part of stock exchange
requirement.
This code requires that the annual report of a major
UK company should contain a report from the

remuneration committee, a statement on corporate
governance, a statement on internal controls, a
statement on the going concern status of company and
a statement of the directors’ responsibilities. The
following is a list of requirement that differs from
under the SOX regulations:
1. The chair of the board should meet with
non-executive directors without the
executive present.
2. Led by the senior independent director, the
non-executive directors should meet without
the chair present at least annually to
appraise her performance and on such other
occasions as are deemed appropriate.
3. The chair of the board and CEO should be
separated. The division of responsibilities
should be clearly established, set out in
writing, and agreed by the board.
4. At least half of the board, excluding the
chair, should be comprised of non-executive
directors and should be independent.
5. The board should appoint one of the
independent non-executive directors to be
the senior independent director. The senior
independent director should be available to
shareholders if they have concerns that have
not been alleviated by top company officials.
6. Shareholders should be invited specially to
approve all new long-term incentive
arrangements and significant changes to
existing schemes unless prohibited by the
Listing Rules.
A recent survey of 310 service executives around
world indicates that the US is generally ahead of the
pack in corporate governance (KPMG, 2003).

1. Which of the following countries has done most to improve
standards of corporate governance over the past year?
2. Which of the following countries has the farthest to go in improving
standards of corporate governance?
Germany. The German systems of corporate
governance reflect their unique structures of legal
rights and arrangements. The corporate decisionmaking process and corporate governance are shared
among stakeholders, shareholders, employees, and
customers. This broad view “encompasses the product
markets, the capital and labor markets, any informal
organizational arrangements which may exist and
function alongside the formal structure.”
Germany has a strong employee co-determination
program. Work councils have extensive participation in
decision-makings and employees are also respected in
the corporate boardroom. These differences are
contrasted with the shareholder-oriented approach to
corporate governance in the US.
One of the distinguishing characteristics of
German corporate governance is the two-tier board of
directors system. The two-tier system of governance
creates different rights and obligations for member of

Germany
7%

UK
16%

US
71%

7%

6%

23%

each board that are set out in the German Stock
Corporation Act and German Corporate Governance
Code. Figure 1 shows the relationships with key
stakeholders groups.
------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 Here
------------------------------------------The management board is charged with managing
the enterprise for the benefit of a wide array of
stakeholders. The supervisory board, whose members
are elected by the shareholders at the annual meeting,
does not have the formal right to give specific
instructions to members of the management board, but
management board is required to report to the
supervisory board at regular intervals. The major
functions of the supervisory board are to appoint and
dismiss the members of the management board and to
determine management remuneration. The management
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board normally takes into consideration on specific
position of the supervisory board.
A potential problem in the German corporate
governance is the dual obligations of members of the
supervisory board. On one hand, they are obliged to act
in the best interests of the company while on the other
hand they have certain obligations toward their specific
constituencies. This conflict of interests may influence
the role and actions of the supervisory board.
The German Stock Corporation Act and German
Commercial Codes establish the regulations for the
preparation of financial statements. The act also details
Audit requirements. Table 1 demonstrates these
provisions and compares the functions of the
management board in Germany and US.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3 Here
--------------------------------------------The functions of the supervisory board are similar
to that of the audit committee in the US. A comparison
of the German and US requirement indicates two
important differences: First, employee participation in
decision-making process is an integral part of the
German governance systems while no employee
participation is presented in the US systems. Second,
the German system relies more on a consensus of
decision-makers, which take into consideration all the
stakeholders in addition to shareholders.
Perspective and implication of SOX act
The SOX Act poses new challenges to management.
The new legislation puts on a significant the
responsibility for fraud detection, though it does not
relieve duties of the audit committee or the auditor. The
board of directors and audit committee are ultimately
responsible for overseeing management’s assessment
of fraud and the entity programs and its control systems.
The audit committee is expected to investigate alleged
wrongdoing brought to its attention.
The SEC implementation rules for SOX made it
clear that increased transparency of financial
information is central to the new regulation. “By
increasing transparency regarding key aspects of
corporate activities and control, the proposals are
designed to improve the quality of information
available to the investor. (www.sec.gov/rules/final/338177.htm)
In order to regain trust from the financial market,
the SOX Act mandates (1) to improve auditor’s
independence by reducing conflicts of interest; (2) to
increase corporate financial reporting responsibility by
requiring a CEO or a CFO certify accuracy of annual
report; and (3) to enhance financial disclosures. It also
significantly increase criminal penalty for noncompliance.
Auditors Independence. The SOX Act attempts
to ensure auditor independence. The law contains
significant provisions designed to strengthen both the

fact and perception of auditor independence. The
auditor is required to directly report to the company’s
audit committee which has new and expanded
obligations to serve on behalf of the board of the
directors as the watchful guidance of shareholder’s
interests. In the past, management has been a primary
contact for the external auditor’s communication with
the audit committee. However the audit committee is
now the appropriate contact for the external auditors.
Corporate Responsibility and Severe Penalty
SOX affirms that CEO and CFO carry primary
responsibility for company financial reports filed with
the SEC and require them to certify the completeness
and accuracy of information and the effectiveness of
internal control. If an executive certify a report that turn
out to be false and misleading, he/she will be facing
severe criminal charges, a possibility of up to 20 years
in prison. Certifying officers can also be forced to
reimburse all or part of compensations earned based on
erroneous financial statements.
Can the SOX Help Regain Public Trust? The
single most important question is whether the SOX Act
will produce what was its primary intended goal:
Regain public trust and the elimination of massive
companywide abuses and financial fraud that rocked
US corporations and capital market particip-ants
recently. To name a few: Enron, Global Crossing,
Tyco Internationals and WorldCom. So far the law has
been good for shareholders, good for companies and
good for government. SOX got people focused on
quality and integrity of financial reports.
Many companies recently hired Chief Governance
Officer (CGO) and Chief Compliance Officer (CCO).
The CCO is supposed to monitor company’s internal
control systems while CGO makes sure that the board
properly functions. The companies instituted CGO or
CCO includes Hershey Foods, Motorola, Pitney Bowes,
Pfizer, Estman Kodak, Sunoco, and American Express.
The provision causing the most trouble is Section 404
which requires CEO and CFO to assess the adequacy of
their company’s internal control. This simply stated
goal turns out to require a vast amount of work. In
many cases, this led many firms to do massive overhaul
of their information technology systems which requires
huge expenditures.
The combination of strengthening auditor’s
independence, increased corporate responsibility and
severe penalty and restored corporate governance
would create environment that is intended by SOX Act.
Volker and Levitt (2004) put it in a very forceful way:
“While there are direct money costs involved in good
corporate governance, we believe that an investment in
good corporate governance, professional integrity and
transparency will pay dividends in the form of investor
confidence, more efficient markets and more market
participation for years to come.” We concur with them
and believe the benefits of the SOX Act will outweigh
the costs of compliance.
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Appendices
Table 1. New Roles for Audit Committees and Auditors. (AICPA 2004).
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

Auditors Report to Audit Committee. Now, auditors will report to and be overseen by a company's audit committee,
not management.
Audit Committees Must Approve All Services. Audit committees must preapprove all services (both audit and nonaudit services not specifically prohibited) provided by its auditor.
Auditor Must Report New Information to Audit Committee. This information includes: critical accounting policies and
practices to be used, alternative treatments of financial information within GAAP that have been discussed with
management, accounting disagreements between the auditor and management, and other relevant communications
between the auditor and management.
Offering Specified Non-Audit Services Prohibited. The new law statutorily prohibits auditors from offering certain
non-audit services to audit clients. These services include: bookkeeping, information systems design and
implementation, appraisals or valuation services, actuarial services, internal audits, management and human resources
services, broker/dealer and investment banking services, legal or expert services unrelated to audit services and other
services the board determines by rule to be impermissible. Other nonaudit services not banned are allowed if
preapproved by the audit committee.
Audit Partner Rotation. The lead audit partner and audit review partner must be rotated every five years on public
company engagements.
Employment Implications. An accounting firm will not be able to provide audit services to a public company if one of
that company's top officials (CEO, Controller, CFO, Chief Accounting Officer, etc.) was employed by the firm and
worked on the company's audit during the previous year.

Table 2. Requirement for foreign multinational corporations
Under the new rules, national securities exchanges and national securities associations will be prohibited from listing any
security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the following requirements.
1. Each member of the audit committee of the issuer must be independent according to the specified criteria in Section
10A(m) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
2. The audit committee must be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the
work of any registered public accounting firm engaged for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or
performing other audit, review or attest services for the issuer, and the registered public accounting firm must report
directly to the audit committee.
3. The audit committee must establish procedures for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints regarding
accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing matters, including procedures for the confidential, anonymous
submission by employees of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.
4. The audit committee must have the authority to engage independent counsel and other advisors, as it determines
necessary to carry out its duties.
5. The issuer must provide appropriate funding for the audit committee.
The new rules will establish Section 10A(m)'s two criteria for audit committee member independence.
1. Audit committee members must be barred from accepting any consulting, advisory or compensatory fee from the
issuer or any subsidiary, other than in the member's capacity as a member of the board or any board committee.
2. An audit committee member must not be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary apart from capacity as a
member of the board or any board committee.
The new rules will apply to both domestic and foreign listed issuers. It is important to note that, based on significant input from
and dialogue with foreign regulators and foreign issuers and their advisers, several provisions, applicable only to foreign private
issuers, have been included that seek to address the special circumstances of particular foreign jurisdictions. These provisions
include

163

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 3, Issue 2, Winter 2005-2006 (continued)
1.
2.
3.
4.

allowing non-management employees to serve as audit committee members, consistent with "co-determination" and
similar requirements in some countries;
allowing shareholders to select or ratify the selection of auditors, also consistent with requirements in many foreign
countries;
allowing alternative structures such as boards of auditors to perform auditor oversight functions where such structures
are provided for under local law; and
addressing the issue of foreign government shareholder representation on audit committees.

The new rules also will make several updates to the Commission's disclosure requirements regarding audit committees,
including updates to the audit committee financial expert disclosure requirements for foreign private issuers.
Table 3. A Comparison of Responsibilities for Financial Reporting Oversight
Financial Reporting Item

Responsible Board
Germany*

Prepare financial statements
Assess propriety and
appropriateness of
accounts
Prepare management report
Legal requirement to approve
Financial statements
Review and approval of quarterly
financial reports
Internal Control system
Risk early recognition system
(going concern evaluation)
Appointment of auditors
Role of the external audit

U.S

Management Board

Management

Supervisory Board
Management Board

Audit Committee
Management

Supervisory Board

Audit Committee

Supervisory Board
Management Board

Audit Committee
Management

Management Board
Supervisory Board
Support Supervisory Board
and
Perform a control function
In the public interest

External auditors
Audit Committee

Protect public interest

*The source for the Financial reporting and other requirements in Germany is the Institut der Wirtschftsprufer’s (German
equivalent of the AICPA) issues paper Financial Reporting, Auditing and Corporate Governance (2003)

Shareholders
Bank Proxy Votes

Shareholders Meeting
Elect ½ or 2/3 of seats,
Selects Chairperson

Elects ½ or 1/3 of seats
Supervisory Board

Labor Unions
often propose
external
representative
Management
Board

Works
Council
Information,
Consultation,
codetermination

Employees

Figure 1. The Legal Structure of Corporate Governance in Germany*
*Jackson, G,. M. Hopner, and A. Kurdelbusch. 2004. Corporate governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages,
Complimentarities, and Tensions. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-E-009: 49.
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